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Abstract: To this day, insurgency is a problem that confounds states all over the world. It 
presents a myriad of problems for the governments responsible for fighting them and there are no 
easy answers. Each insurgency is different, but there are general steps that counterinsurgents can 
take to successfully put these rebellions down without resorting to indiscriminate violence. This 
is where the literature has fallen short. It does a great job of explaining how and why 
counterinsurgents have failed, but does not take the next step and prescribe what can be done and 
how. This study seeks to understand that. In order to do so, the examples of civil conflicts in 
Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia will be analyzed. Peru emerged from its conflict with the Shining 
Path victorious. Nepal was forced into a stalemate with the Maoists and the Cambodian 
government was overthrown by the Khmer Rouge. By comparing these three cases, this study 
will pull out what made Peru successful in contrast to Nepal and Cambodia. The analysis will 
find that Peru used selective violence by engaging its civilian populace in its own defense as well 
as adaptations in its intelligence strategy that emphasized tracking and surveillance rather than 
interrogation and torture to great success. 
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Introduction 
The problems associated with communism did not disappear with the Cold War’s end in 
the early 1990s and Maoism did not die with Mao in 1976.  People continue to be willing to 
ignite war under the banner of these ideas and governments continue to be unable to stop the 
insurgent rebellions they create. Nepal is proof of that.  It was only in 2006 that Nepal’s ten year 
conflict, responsible for the deaths of 13000 Nepalis and the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands more, staggered to a close (Marsh, 2007).  The Maoists adopted a classical strategy of 
operating in the rural areas through guerrilla warfare in the hopes of eventually taking the cities 
and overthrowing the state.  It nearly worked in Nepal despite the lessons of Cambodia’s civil 
war going unlearned.  Hundreds of thousands died during the Cambodian Civil War and the 
victory of the Khmer Rouge in 1975 initiated a genocide that would consume the country for the 
rest of the 1970s.  In Peru, close to 70,000 people died during the twelve year battle against the 
Shining Path (Fielding & Shortland, 2010). 
There is no shortage of literature exploring the nature of leftist insurgency and civil 
conflicts: how and why they start, the factors that allow insurgents to be successful, and even 
their tactics.  Yet, there is little literature that explores insurgencies from the perspective of the 
governments responsible for fighting them.  In essence, the question this paper seeks to answer is 
what exactly constitutes an effective counterinsurgency strategy?  What are the specific tactics 
that inhibit rebel capacity? What impact do they have and why did they work or not work?   
This paper will examine these questions by utilizing a qualitative and comparative case 
study approach, using the conflicts in the countries of Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia.  These states 
were chosen for a multitude of reasons.  First and foremost, they each had to cope with a 
Communist rebel group with charismatic leadership that posed a direct challenge to the authority 
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of the state by utilizing similar tactics such as bombings and assassinations (McClintock, 1998).  
For instance, these Communist groups were often based in the rural areas of the countries they 
were fighting in and effectively used guerilla tactics combined with conventional military 
strength.  Second, each of these states had experienced terrible poverty and had geographical 
features that made it increasingly prohibitive for the government to project its power out into the 
poorer, rural areas, providing an almost unreachable base of operations for the rebels (Bohara, 
Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006).  Third, each country had, to a degree, authoritarian governments. 
Though Peru and Nepal were technically democratic, this label would be lost for both of them. 
Peru had a polity score of +8 (which signifies a democratic regime with 10 being the most 
democratic and -10 being the most repressive) and with President Alberto Fujimori’s in 1990, 
this score plummeted to -4 (Marshall et al., 2011). Up until 2002 when King Gyanendra 
dissolved parliament, Nepal had a polity score of +6 (Marshall et al., 2011) After that point, it 
fell to -6. Through its five year conflict in the early 1970s under the military government of Lon 
Nol, Cambodia averaged a score of -6 (Marshall et al., 2011).  
  However, there is a significant difference across these cases that forms the basis of this 
study: the outcomes of war.  Peru was victorious in its struggle against the Shining Path, 
effectively ending its challenge to the state in 1992.  Nepal, after ten years of vicious fighting, 
battled to a stalemate in 2006 with its Maoist rebels with both sides signed the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement ending the war.  Cambodia was defeated outright in its struggle against the 
Khmer Rouge.  In April 1975, after five years of fighting, the Khmer Rouge swept into Phnom 
Penh, the government fell, and the regime of Pol Pot was born.  This study seeks to understand 
why Peru was successful.  What did the Peruvian government do that crippled the Shining Path 
and how did its strategy impact the course of the insurgency?  Why was Nepal unable to 
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vanquish the Maoists yet able to prevent the Maoists from expanding their power and toppling 
the state?  What did Cambodia do wrong to make the government fall so completely to the 
Khmer Rouge? Could what Peru did have saved Cambodia from defeat and provided victory to 
Nepal?  This study will ultimately answer those questions by demonstrating that Peru’s strategy 
revolved around certain tactics such as civilian self-defense and discriminate government 
violence as well as increased intelligence capability.  
 
Literature Review 
Definitions  
Counterinsurgency strategy has perplexed countries large and small.  For decades, states 
have struggled to defeat the insurgencies that challenge them, coping with various strategies to 
try to guarantee success.  Peru, Nepal, and Cambodia each struggled mightily with their 
Communist rebellions.  Each suffered immense casualties fighting and each struggle lasted for 
years.  However, only one state was victorious: Peru.  This study seeks to answer why. Why did 
Peru’s tactics create success and does the literature support what Peru did? Why did both 
Cambodia’s and Nepal’s strategies fail?  Though counterinsurgency theorists have seemed to 
coalesce around various elements of counterinsurgency strategy, the literature addressing the 
specific concerns of governments facing homegrown insurgencies is sparse on the whole.  This 
study will fill an important gap.  It will provide a comparative framework for directly analyzing 
the strategies discussed in the literature in a contemporary context and will pull out the specific 
tactics that make counterinsurgency effective. The literature does not make the direct 
comparative analysis between specific cases, as this study will, which will help break through the 
theory and into the practical implications of strategy. 
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 Before delving into the literature, it is important to first establish a few definitions that 
are critical for understanding the context of this study.  A government victory is defined as the 
―destruction of an insurgent organization or its capacity to challenge the state or the end of 
conflict without incumbent concessions to the insurgent group‖ (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This 
occurred in the Peruvian case in 1992. Though the Shining Path still exists as a criminal 
organization today, after 1992, it was completely removed as a threat to the monopoly on power 
of the regime (McClintock, 1998).  A ―tie‖ is defined as a conflict-ending settlement where the 
government is forced to make concessions to the insurgent group; however, neither group attains 
it ideal aims (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This definition fits the Nepalese case.  In 2006, the Maoists 
and the government signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the war.  Though the 
Maoists got to join the government, many of their demands were unmet and their pursuit of a 
communist state went unaccomplished.  A defeat is defined as the complete capitulation of the 
government to insurgent forces (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). This applies to the Khmer Rouge victory 
in the Cambodian Civil War and subsequent overthrow of the royal government in the early 
1970s (Wilson & Lyall, 2009). 
 
Competing Scholarly Perspectives – Population Control 
 Before launching into a thorough analysis of the literature, it is important to note that 
most of the literature focuses on counterinsurgency strategy for third parties intervening in civil 
conflicts.  This means that the literature is mostly examining strategy for Great Powers like the 
United States and France when they encounter insurgencies after invasion rather than from the 
perspective of domestic governments tasked with defeating homegrown rebellions such as Peru, 
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Nepal, and Cambodia.  That being said, the prescriptions of the literature are still useful in 
examining counterinsurgency strategy. 
There seems to be a general consensus on a couple of elements of insurgency and 
counterinsurgent strategy.  First and foremost, classical, communist insurgent strategy generally 
revolves around the fact that the government possesses greater conventional strength; that is, 
insurgents avoid meeting government forces on the open battlefield and thus will tend to operate 
in the rural areas where they can remain hidden and away from the government’s power centers 
(Wilson & Lyall, 2009; Buhaug, Gates, & Lujula, 2009).  This type of warfare is considered to 
be guerrilla warfare which is defined as a strategy of armed resistance that ―1) uses small, 
mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding 
direct battle when possible and 2) seeks to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the 
noncombatant population‖ (Wilson & Lyall, 2009).  The government seeks to engage the 
opponent in ―peripheral and rugged terrain‖ while insurgents ―hover just below the military 
horizon, hiding and relying on harassment and surprise‖ to impose unbearable costs on the state 
(Kalyvas, 2005).  The insurgencies of the three cases utilized these tactics and thus fall under this 
definition.  The Maoist rebellion in Nepal literally got its start from clandestine attacks on 
government supply depots in the mountainous west which provided the must-needed armament 
to ignite the insurgency (Marsh, 2007).  The Khmer Rouge eliminated the Cambodian air force 
in one swift sneak attack, blowing it up in January of 1971 (Sat, 1979).  Cambodia never 
recovered.  In Peru, the Shining Path utilized political assassinations and bombings to instill 
terror and strike government forces without actually engaging them (McClintock, 1998).   
 The literature seems to have a positive consensus around the idea of ―population control‖, 
that is, counterinsurgency strategy revolves more around engaging and controlling the population 
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than physically destroying the insurgency. However, it is around this issue that there is a bit of 
divergence in what exactly this means and why it has failed again and again.  The literature tends 
to speak generally about this issue, saying that the population must be won or that intelligence is 
crucial to the effort without specifically prescribing how, which is what the study seeks to 
answer (Galula, 1964).   
One theory that explains why governments have been unable to do this is that the 
mechanization of the modern day armed forces has caused government forces to be unable to 
control the population the way that 19
th
 century ―foraging‖ militaries could.  This approach says 
that 19
th
 century militaries were more focused on infantry that were better able to collect local 
information and keep insurgents out of civilian areas.  By mechanizing and utilizing tanks, 
trucks, and planes however, counterinsurgent forces have lost that capability since World War I, 
which has negated their conventional advantages over weaker insurgents (Wilson & Lyall, 
2009).  The reliance on mechanized forces has created a tendency for government forces to stay 
away from the local areas where insurgents generally operate and use their forces from afar to 
attack. This explains then why insurgents refuse to engage the government on the open 
battlefield and why governments experience ―information starvation‖ (Wilson & Lyall, 2009).  
Governments have no idea what is going on in rebel controlled territory since they are leaving 
their power centers. As a result, the success rate of counterinsurgent campaigns has fallen since 
World War I.   
 Since civilian identification and control become impossible, governments rely on a much 
more dangerous tactic called ―draining the sea.‖ Draining the sea is the idea that as a response to 
guerrilla warfare, governments will engage in mass killing, regardless of regime type, as a means 
of annihilating the insurgent movement (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Since the 
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population is the base of support and its allegiances are almost impossible to discern, 
governments often decide to wipe out large swaths of civilians to both send a message to people 
who back the insurgents and to cut off rebel support bases.  This approach allows the 
government to bring its full forces to bear and intimidate the civilian populace while physically 
incapacitating the insurgents, a response made easier by the mechanization phenomenon 
discussed earlier (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). Though this may alienate civilians, 
governments generally believe that the rewards of violence are higher than the costs.  The 
importance of examining this approach is that 1) this is a particularly brutal approach that has 
immense consequences and 2) it is an unfortunately prevalent strategy among governments. It 
wreaks havoc on the civilian populace, destroys basic infrastructure, and perpetuates further 
conflict by causing mass civilian defection to rebel groups.  It is not surprising then that the cases 
will demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this tactic. 
 These explanations seem to tie with a useful framework that describes the ―trilemma‖ 
government forces face.  The ―trilemma‖ theory says that government forces face three choices: 
force protection, distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, and the physical 
destruction of the insurgents (Zambernardi, 2010).  Unfortunately, governments can only choose 
two of these options while sacrificing the third.  For instance, a government can decide to protect 
its force while physically eliminating the insurgents, but this comes at the risk of killing large 
numbers of civilians (Zambernardi, 2010).  A government can protect its force and population 
but it then loses the ability to actually eliminate the insurgents. Alternatively, it can decide to 
protect the civilian population while eliminating the insurgents which puts the state’s military 
forces at risk for higher casualties which hurts domestic support (Zambernardi, 2010). This is the 
fundamental problem in counterinsurgency: some sacrifice has to be made.  Proponents of this 
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theory go further however and argue that force protection must be sacrificed with the emphasis 
being placed on the destruction of military capabilities of the insurgents and control of the 
populace. Sacrificing the lives of the armed forces is necessary and ―it is…the political capacity 
of accepting and tolerating human costs which is key to winning these wars‖ (Zambernardi, 
2010). 
 The final school of thought that this study will look at and utilize heavily, in part because 
it seems to address the arguments of the other theories, examines the rational basis behind both 
insurgent and government violence and follows logically from the ―identification‖ element of 
strategy described in the trilemma.  According to this theory, violence serves two purposes: ―the 
demonstration or signaling function, whereby violence is used to signal capability, induce 
mobilization and attract international attention, and the terrorist function, whereby violence is 
used to deter civilians from collaborating with the enemy‖ (Kalyvas, 2005).  Rather than simply 
a facet of war, violence is a strategic resource used to shape the motivations of the population.  
This serves as a contrast to the ―draining the sea‖ concept of violence previously mentioned 
where government brutality is used to simply blast out insurgents hiding amongst the civilian 
populace. In guerrilla warfare, one side will be discriminate in its use of violence in order to 
identify friend and foe and mold public opinion. 
 In Peru, the Shining Path used violence to strike overwhelming fear into both the 
populace and its opposition and terror was a hallmark of the Maoist strategy in Nepal. So 
regarding the violence then becomes this: who can control it? Who can wield violence to identify 
the foe without alienating the populace?  The answers to these questions often signal who has the 
upper hand in the conflict.  There is a direct, correlative relationship between violence against 
civilians and military success.  Rebel groups that are losing the military struggle are more likely 
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to attack the civilian population as a means of raising the cost of conflict on the government 
(Fielding & Shortland, 2010).  As rebel military defeats go up, indiscriminate killing of civilians 
rises with it making the government more likely to respond with greater force.  Thus, a greater 
cycle of violence is perpetuated and the conflict is escalated ultimately straining the 
government’s war effort further suggesting that the government that is forced into excessive 
civilian violence is going to lose. 
 
Weaknesses of the Literature and Theory 
 While the consensus around population control is solid, the literature, for the most part, 
seems to be missing some of the nuance in its analysis of strategy.  The literature seems to 
generally lack specifics regarding how governments can most effectively prevent insurgent 
penetration of civilian areas.  Instead of explaining how governments can succeed against 
guerillas, the literature seems most focused on analyzing how they have failed (Galula, 1964). 
That being said, this study will go beyond looking at just the problem and instead look into how 
governments can most effectively use their strength.  
To start, the idea that it is the shift toward mechanized forces that has caused 
counterinsurgent strategies to fail is not entirely convincing. While it is absolutely an associated 
factor, there are a number of confounding factors that make it hard to believe that there is a 
directly causal relationship. Guerrilla warfare is not a uniform phenomenon because insurgencies 
can differ on a whole host of issues such as ideology, religion, and ethnicity which can present 
very different strategic problems.  Insurgencies have changed in character since World War II 
and especially since the 19
th
 century, becoming both longer and deadlier (Lyall & Wilson, 2009).  
As mentioned before, what seems to matter is why and the extent to which indiscriminate 
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violence is being used against the insurgents, not how. The mechanization argument might 
answer the how and it may enable governments to be indiscriminate with force, but it does not 
address the underlying issues creating that circumstance in the first place. As a result, this study 
does not find this explanation sufficient for answering why governments are failing to put down 
insurgencies.    
 The trilemma theory does present another framework for understanding counterinsurgent 
strategy and the forces that dictate it.  It does a good job of generally describing the conditions 
government faces; however, it seems to present a false trichotomy.  The theory treats the three 
elements (force protection, physical destruction of the insurgents, and making the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants) as equal options where the loss of one element hurts 
the counterinsurgency strategy as a whole.  This does not need to be the case though—that is, a 
well run strategy that utilizes two of the elements does not necessarily need a third. To treat them 
as mutually exclusive goals is not necessary and the Peruvian case will ultimately demonstrate 
that. Once again though, this explanation does not really go past the dilemma description other 
than saying that destroying insurgents and ensuring local population support are important 
enough goals that sacrifices the soldiers in the armed forces are necessary. Furthermore, these 
options are not equal and should not be treated as such. The distinction between combatant and 
non-combatant is critical but it provides a foundation for preserving the other two factors. A 
government that knows who is friend and who is enemy can protect its force by selectively 
engaging it in rebel strongholds and preventing it from being drawn into unnecessarily bloody 
civilian conflicts. The case studies will demonstrate this idea. Consequently, this makes the 
acquisition and utilization of reliable intelligence critical to the war effort. 
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Argument and Hypotheses 
 This study is important because it will provide the most direct analysis of successful 
counterinsurgent strategies.  The literature has great analysis of the adverse conditions 
counterinsurgent forces face in taking on rebellions and consensus on general platitudes on what 
creates success.  While these platitudes provide the ―what‖ of certain tactics, it is crucially 
missing the ―how‖ and ―why.‖  This type of detail is incredibly important and it is the aim of this 
study to begin to tease this out using similar cases. None of the theories provided by the literature 
provide the basis for understanding what makes counterinsurgency successful and the tactics 
they discuss do not lead to victorious outcomes. 
To reiterate the main point, the government that fights the best is the one that fights with 
the most intelligence and deliberation. It does not drain the sea and wipe out whole villages for 
the sake of eliminating insurgents. Rather, it responsibly engages and cooperates with those 
villages to provide their own defense.  
 
H1: The use of discriminate violence through the promotion of civilian self-defense is critical to 
enemy identification and ultimately, military success.   
 
This entails a genuine effort on the government’s part to empower civilians to defend 
themselves as a means of government strategy and the ability to successfully do so to bring 
conflict to a favorable conclusion. Civilian defense prevents the populace from defecting to the 
insurgents, protects the armed forces, and allows the government to selectively employ those 
forces. By arming these groups, keeping them under military oversight, and ensuring strong 
14 
 
communication between the government and the people, the armed forces can prevent arms and 
civilians from falling into insurgent hands. 
Governments must be more responsible and more discerning when it engages its forces 
and in order to do so successfully, the importance of intelligence comes to the forefront. Without 
intelligence gathering and analysis, ―governments would be unable to implement any measures 
against terrorists‖ (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006). Governments traditionally rely on what is called 
―human intelligence‖ to acquire information. This generally entails capturing a person believed 
to be involved with the rebel organization and questioning them to get the prisoner ―to provide 
additional information concerning the involvement and location of others involved in terrorist 
operation‖ (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006).  Unfortunately, most of these interrogations are driven 
by torture which is defined as ―any act which by severe pain and suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes  as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession‖  (Guiora & Page, 2005-2006). Though governments may 
often feel the need to torture because it is easy and instills fear into the population, it is 
notoriously unreliable. Prisoners will often make false confessions in order to get the torture to 
stop, rendering most of the information the government obtains useless (Stevenson, 2001). What 
this seems to indicate is that the successful government will not indiscriminately torture civilians 
to acquire any information it can without regard to reliability.  
 
H2: A counterinsurgency strategy that does not rely on extrajudicial killing, torture, and forced 
disappearances is more successful in resolving conflict than one that does.   
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This means utilizing different tactics such as tracking insurgent operatives to get to rebel 
leadership as well as constant surveillance in order to anticipate their attacks and understand their 
overall structure. Coordination between the different parties responsible for both intelligence 
gathering and the armed forces is critical for the intelligence to be useful in the field. By 
acquiring information through more reliable and less violent means, the government can not only 
differentiate friend from foe, but also win populace allegiance and prevent defection to the 
rebellion. Analyzing the three very similar cases separated by only outcome will make it clear 
how this idea of discriminate force and innovation in intelligence plays out in actual conflict. 
 
Research Design 
Data on the three cases was collected in different ways.  I researched the Cambodian 
Civil War by referencing General Sak Sutsakhan’s (Lieutenant General of the Cambodian 
military, Chief of the General Staff of the Khmer Armed Forces, and the last Chief of the State of 
the Khmer Republic) report on the war which covers the conflict from before it actually broke 
(discussing Cambodia’s general preparedness) to both government and Communist tactics up 
through the end of the conflict.  His account was buffeted by secondary sources.  Similarly, 
research on Nepal and Peru came from secondary sources.  However, original analysis on the 
three cases will be done through a directly comparative approach that revolves around the 
adoption of certain tactics.  This research will be useful in understanding the general trends that 
characterized each conflict and it will make clear who was successful at what and how that 
translated into their respective conflict outcomes.  
 
Data Analysis 
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Case Overview 
Peru 
As stated previously, Peru is a prime example of a country that managed to end the 
insurgent challenge to the authority of the state.  The Shining Path emerged as response to 
terrible economic conditions in the country, especially for the rural peasants. Thus it formed its 
base of operations in the rural areas of the country and secured the support of the peasantry as 
well as disaffected teachers and youth (Kent, 1993).  It then planned to eventually move in on the 
cities, cut off their food lines, and ultimately topple the government, establishing a communist 
state (Kent, 1993). For a long time, they were successful. They were extremely effective in using 
intimidation to create discord in the areas they were attacking and in control of. The government 
did not know how to respond.  President Belaunde initially marginalized the Sendero threat.  As 
the threat grew in late 1981, the government introduced emergency laws in affected areas and it 
was not until 1982 that Belanunde started using antiterrorist police to combat the insurgency, 
refusing to utilize the military (McClintock, 1998) (Fielding & Shortland, 2010).  In fact, it was 
only at that point that Belaunde declared a state of emergency in the provinces of Ayacucho, 
allowing the armed forces to occupy these provinces, suspend civil rights, and create ―civil 
defense patrols‖ that gave peasants the capability to attack the insurgents. (McClintock, 1998) 
(Fumerton, 2002). The police were given wide latitude to torture, arbitrarily arrest people, and 
murder citizens who were hard to distinguish from rebels. The newly established civil defense 
patrols, while important later, did not have a large impact initially (Fumerton, 2002).  It would 
not be until they expanded that their effectiveness increased. 
The next president, Alan Garcia, adopted a different approach, trying to preserve basic 
human rights while fighting in and simultaneously investing in the troubled regions.  However, 
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this had the adverse effect of alienating the military and was ultimately ineffectual because 
Sendero was already firmly entrenched in that area (McClintock, 1998).  In essence, it was too 
little, too late (McClintock, 1998).   
Garcia did make a couple of changes however that laid the foundation for the ultimate 
defeat of the Shining Path and provided concrete turning points in the war.  First, he expanded 
the capacity of the government’s intelligence which would lead to Leader Abimael Guzman’s 
capture in September 1992.  Second, he promoted the rondas, which were the civil defense 
patrols formed under Belaunde.  President Alberto Fujimori then came into power in 1990 with a 
much heavier hand toward fighting the insurgents, repairing relations with the military, 
stabilizing the economy by introducing market reforms that brought down hyperinflation and 
created growth, and then reaping the benefits of Garcia’s shift in strategy (McClintock, 1998). 
Though this had the effect of creating more poverty, it set Peru on the course of economic 
stabilization. Examining Peru provides a great case to examine the evolution of tactics across a 
conflict and how the changes in tactics affect rebel capacity. 
 
Nepal 
The civil war in Nepal, like its counterpart in Peru, ignited as a response to the failure of 
economic development.  The Maoists were able to mobilize ―disadvantaged youth from the 
remote and rural areas in their fight against the political system‖ (Do & Iyer, 2007). On February 
13, 1996, the Maoists initiated the war in Western Nepal, attacking Nepali police and army 
barracks (for the purpose of getting weapons) and spreading from there with the ultimate 
objective of establishing a communist state (Marsh, 2007).  As the war proceeded, the Maoists 
stepped up their clandestine attacks and were able to supply themselves through these raids on 
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government depots. In November 2001, the Maoists initiated a much larger assault, raiding the 
headquarters of the Royal Nepal Army and in the city of Ghorahi, they killed 14 soldiers and 
stole ―hundreds of modern weapons, including SLRs (self-loading rifles), SMGs (Sten-machine 
guns/carbines), LMGs (light machine guns), light pistols, mortar grenades, and several rounds of 
ammunition‖ (Marsh, 2007). The government in Kathmandu responded with extremely brutal 
tactics, arresting and torturing over 1000 people in 1999 alone and in fact, more people were 
killed by the state between 1998 and 1999 than were killed by the Maoists (Do & Iyer, 2007) 
(Stevenson, 2001).  In 2001, the royal family was assassinated by the Crown Prince Diprendra 
and a truce was called.  It was short lived however.  The Maoists broke off the truce in 
November of that year, a state of emergency was declared, and the army was mobilized.  
Parliament was dissolved in 2002, another ceasefire was declared and then broken by the 
Maoists, who cited the government’s refusal to ―consider their demand for a Constituent 
Assembly‖ as the reason for their return to violence (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006) (Do & 
Iyer, 2007).  The Maoists continued to progress toward the urban areas until 2005 when King 
Gyanendra effectively declared martial law.  The other political parties, as well as the Maoists, 
banded together to protest the king’s action and as a result: Gyanendra abdicated in 2006. 
Consequently, Parliament was reinstated and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, 
ending the conflict.  
 
Cambodia 
Cambodia was, in a sense, doomed from the start.  First, Cambodia received disparate 
types of aid from the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of 
China.  This created huge logistical problems as the ―divergence of materiel affected the training 
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of combat and technical personnel, maintenance, and especially the supply of spare parts and 
ammunition‖ (Sutsakhan, 1980).  This training was further hampered when Prince Sihanouk, 
who led until Lon Nol’s military coup in 1970, decided to engage the military in the economic 
development of the country, having them build roads, schools, hospitals, et cetera. This had the 
consequence of neglecting the armed forces’ general level of preparedness and military training, 
as well as making the military burn through the aid that it received from the United States and 
France (Sutsakhan, 1980).  In contrast, the Khmer Rouge were very well organized and prepared. 
They set themselves up in a three-tiered structure creating ―popular forces and auto-defense 
groups at the city and village levels‖ meant to capture territory, and then a general force that 
directly reported to military command (Sutsakhan, 1980). The Communists had forces at every 
level. By setting themselves up at the village level even before the conflict’s start in 1970, they 
were already prepared to prevent government co-optation of the civilian populace. Further, the 
Khmer Rouge spread anti-government propaganda, cut economic supply lines, and did 
everything it could to create chaos in the villages so as to completely undermine government 
support. Thus, when the conflict broke out, the Communists were easily able to take the frontier 
provinces along the border with Vietnam and Laos and hold on to them as the conflict progressed 
(Sutsakhan, 1980).  
As a response, Cambodian leader Lon Nol called for the expansion of the FANK (Forces 
Armees Nationales Khmeres) throughout the entire nation, setting up recruiting and training 
centers in the provinces to accelerate the rate of new recruitment and to hone combat skills.  This 
proved initially successful in increasing FANK’s preparedness, but the Communists still 
routinely the new units because they had vastly superior weaponry.  In essence, Lon Nol tried to 
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turn the FANK into some grand institution like the US army in a rapid period of time without the 
prerequisite development that such institutions have to undergo (Sutsakhan, 1980).  
Cambodia’s model of counterinsurgency was a top-down method that failed to properly 
incorporate the civilian population into the overall strategy. The fighting force was ill-equipped, 
ill-trained, and had fleeting allegiance to the government, especially as the communists gained 
ground. As the war progressed, the FANK continued to be wracked by corruption (military 
officials claiming phantom personnel in their units to make them seem bigger than they were) 
and ineffectual tactics. By late 1972, FANK was basically trying to defend Phnom Penh and the 
area around it.  People were fleeing the rural areas making the humanitarian situation in Phnom 
Penh progressively worse. The armed forces, beset by the myriad problems discussed before, 
disintegrated in the face of the ruthlessly efficient Khmer Rouge. The city was ultimately 
overrun in April 1975 and the Khmer Republic fell.  
 
Results 
Hypothesis 1: Indiscriminate Violence and Citizen Patrols 
 As previously discussed, Hypothesis 1 outlined two critical elements of 
counterinsurgency strategy: discriminate use of government violence and empowerment of the 
civilian population to defend itself. These two strategies indicate that the government is not only 
in control of the military situation (a reversion to indiscriminate violence against civilians 
generally means that the government is beginning to get desperate), but that it also has a strong 
relationship with the people that encourages their participation in defense and prevents their 
defection to the insurgents. On both of these measures, Peru scores better than both Nepal and 
Cambodia. 
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Peru 
Peru’s engagement of its peasant population in its own defense was crucial to the 
country’s winning strategy.  The Peruvian case is demonstrative of the idea that a government 
does not necessarily need to face the ―trilemma‖ nor does it need to resort to indiscriminate 
violence to achieve strategic objectives.  Peru was eventually able to facilitate the self-defense of 
the population against the Shining Path through the formation of the rondas.  Rondas were 
peasant defense patrols that were armed by the military but were tasked with defending 
themselves against the incursions of the Shining Path (McClintock, 1998).  This tactic served all 
three elements prescribed by the trilemma: it ensured civilian support by allowing the peasants to 
defend themselves, protected the government’s forces from the actual fighting, and physically 
eliminated insurgents. The rondas came into existence in southern Peru in the province of 
Huaychao on January 21, 1983 when seven Senderistas were killed by villagers as a response to 
Sendero abuses in the area (Mitchell & Hancock, 2007). This response was met with national 
praise by the country and the government began integrating what came to be called ―rondas 
campesinas‖ into the overall counterinsurgency strategy. This approach was officially formalized 
in late 1983 as these rondas were incorporated into the first ―civilian defense committees‖ and 
the Peruvian military began to give them arms and provide oversight to ensure that the arms did 
not fall into the wrong hands McClintock, 1998). These committees were formed by the Marine 
infantry and through government support, their numbers swelled to 700 rondas in 1989 to more 
than 2,500 just eight years later (Mitchell & Hancock, 2007). This drastic increase in the number 
of rondas had a twofold effect: it reduced the burden on the military to defend these areas and the 
peasants were extremely vociferous defenders of their homes. The government was successfully 
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able to turn peasant anger against Sendero into a productive way of fighting the rebels while still 
reducing the terrible burden on the armed forces.  
 
Nepal 
  In contrast, Nepal’s use of violence was indiscriminate and was responsible for more 
casualties in the war than the Maoists were.  Throughout the course of the conflict, there was a 
general level of high hostility between the government and the civilian population. The 
government’s treatment of the civilians was generally abhorrent and for many, there was very 
little incentive for people to lay down their lives, especially in Maoist controlled areas, to fight 
for the government. This was especially true after 2001. In that year, there were only 643 civilian 
casualties (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). However, in December of that year, the royal family 
was abruptly killed Crown Prince Diprenda and King Gyanendra took the throne. He took a 
much harder stance against the Maoists as well as the civilian population, dissolving Parliament 
and declaring a state of emergency. Basic constitutional rights were suspended and martial law 
was enacted. In 2002, 4,647 people were killed in fighting, a total that represents 1/3 of the war’s 
total casualties (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006). Thus, when Nepal tried to emulate Peruvian 
strategy by creating ―civil defense‖ units by distributing arms to the civilian population, it is 
unsurprising then that the strategy failed (Marsh, 2007). Further, there was no coordination 
between government forces and the civil defense patrols in was trying to facilitate throughout the 
country in part because the government could not access much of the areas outside of 
Kathmandu and the other cities. As a result, the government could not ensure that the weapons it 
was distributing would not fall into the wrong hands and that the civilian defense units would 
stay loyal to the government, an issue that became very potent over the course of the war.  
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In short, the government’s strategy was flawed from the start from the time that the 
Maoists first struck in 1996. When the war started, the police were the only line of defense and 
the military was only really mobilized when King Gyanendra took control in late 2001. The 
military’s strategy though was not focused on controlling the civilian population. It was almost 
solely focused on eliminating Maoist insurgents, no matter the cost. It is unsurprising then that 
casualties were so high in 2002 after Gyanendra moved to a much more brutal strategy. The 
Maoists were allowed to operate without much resistance from the civilian populace because the 
military did not support them in the way that Peru did. 
 
Cambodia  
As previously mentioned, Cambodia sent out a call to the rest of the country to get 
volunteers for the military.  While the ranks of the military did swell, the army simply did not 
have the ability to absorb all of these new recruits.  They were given outdated American, British, 
and French weapons from the 1950s and the training period for new recruits was cut by 50% to 
―accelerate the creation of new units‖ (Sutsakhan, 1980). Even though the enthusiasm for joining 
the army was there, by late 1970, the Khmer Rouge had already taken northeast Cambodia, 
which effectively cut those newly created units off from the rest of the country. The FANK then 
tried to empower the villagers to defend themselves in much the same way as Peru and Nepal. 
However, the government again gave them extremely outdated arms that no longer had 
ammunition in production. It is no surprise then that the combination of little training time and 
extremely obsolete weaponry led the village defense forces and the FANK to absolute defeat 
(Sutsakhan, 1980).  However, as the war progressed, civilian enthusiasm for the government war 
effort dissipated. In connection with the Vietnam War, Lon Nol had supported American efforts 
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to bomb Communist forces and bases in Cambodia (Kiernan, 1996). The bombs were 
responsible for the deaths of thousands of Cambodians in part because Lon Nol was not 
completely honest with the Americans. What the Americans were told were ―training camps‖ 
were ―in fact merely political indoctrination sessions held in village halls and pagodas‖ (Kiernan, 
1996). As a result, civilians flocked to the Communists to flee the bombings. The Khmer Rouge 
were very effectively able to channel civilian fear of American bombings and turn them against 
the government. As the communists gained ground, civilians fled for Phnom Penh, the final 
refuge for the government for much of the last half of the conflict. By April 1975, approximately 
six million Cambodians out of a total population of seven million (including almost three million 
in Phnom Penh) lived under government control even though the Khmer Rouge had conquered 
most of the country (Sat, 1980).  
 
Figure 1: Summary of Hypothesis 1 
 IV: Military 
oversight of 
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distribution 
to civilian 
groups 
IV: Up-to-
date arms 
technology 
IV: 
Military 
oversight 
of civilian 
defense 
activities 
IV: 
Discriminate 
use of 
government 
violence 
DV: 
Success? 
Peru Yes Yes Yes Yes Victory 
Nepal No Yes No No Stalemate 
Cambodia No No No No Defeat 
  
Alternate Hypotheses 
 The alternate hypothesis for Hypothesis 1 would predict that by engaging in 
indiscriminate violence without regards to the civilian population, governments can force 
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insurgents out into the open where their conventional military strength would provide victory. 
The findings for Nepal and Cambodia seem to utterly refute that conclusion. They engaged in 
that type of violence and not only did it fail to smoke out insurgents, it also caused mass civilian 
defection. This underscores the importance of executing this strategy carefully. Peru engaged 
their population by not only providing them with modern arms, but also with guidance and 
oversight. At all times there was both communication and coordination between the military and 
the rondas which allowed them to jointly execute strategy. In contrast, Nepal tried to just 
distribute arms and hope for the best. Unfortunately for them, most of these arms ended up in 
Maoist control. They only had success in areas where the Maoists were civilians grew weary of 
Maoist abuse. The government was never truly able to capitalize on this resentment however, in 
part, because the anger it inspired was just as strong. This was the case as well in Cambodia. 
Both resorted to indiscriminate violence with the Cambodians going so far as to lie to the 
Americans in order for them to bomb a wider area (Kiernan, 1996). Rather than cower in fear of 
the government, they ran into the arms of the communists, bolstering their ranks and depressing 
government morale. These cases clearly demonstrate that indiscriminate violence is not a viable 
strategy for military success against an insurgent, guerilla group. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Intelligence Strategy 
Combined with their adjusted intelligence tactics, Peru did not necessarily have to 
concern itself with sacrificing one of the elements of the trilemma to carry out the other two. It 
also did not have to engage in the type of violence characterized by the Nepalese and Cambodian 
cases.  To be sure, Peru engaged in torture and forced disappearances through the course of the 
war. Even today, President Alberto Fujimori sits in prison for his crimes against humanity. 
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However, the argument here is that Peru’s intelligence strategy was not only different from both 
Nepal and Cambodia’s, but it also proved to be a critical factor in bringing down the Shining 
Path.  
 
Peru 
The Peruvian government moved from traditional torture-based interrogation to 
unconventional tracking of Shining Path leadership, which proved to be a critical change in 
tactics.  Peruvian intelligence traditionally captured Senderistas and interrogated them to get the 
whereabouts of the leadership, but this ultimately led nowhere as confessions provided under 
torture are notoriously unreliable (Stevenson, 2001).  The turning came when the Special 
Intelligence Group (GEIN) was created in March 1990. They chose to work with a variety of 
methods and the main point to be made here is that GEIN was adaptable and repeatedly 
experimented with varying tactics to great success. For example, rather than trying to glean 
information through interrogation, GEIN would track members of Sendero both by analyzing 
evidence left at the scene of attacks and through relatives (McClintock, 1998). Once the SIG 
identified a Sendero operative, he would be placed under constant surveillance. By observing the 
operative at all times and especially during Sendero activities, the SIG was able to discern the 
organization’s structure as well as anticipate further attacks. The SIG would then evaluate the 
mission, making ―constructive criticism‖ that would lead to improvements, thus Peru’s 
intelligence capabilities were constantly getting better over the course of the conflict. (Oliva, 
2005).  
All of these steps were taken to acheive the eventual goal of taking down the Shining 
Path leadership and their results almost immediately began to look promising (McClintock, 
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1998). In September, GEIN disrupted Sendero’s ―propaganda apparatus and the next year, in 
January 1991, they declared the capture of electronic files and videos showing Guzman dancing 
with his deputies. The police could prove that Guzman was alive‖ (Oliva, 2005). At the same 
time, the intelligence bureaucracy was decentralized, allowing for better communication between 
officials at the regional level and headquarters in Lima (Oliva, 2005). As a result of its 
adjustment, the government was able to capture Guzman in September 1992. After this point, the 
Shining Path’s threat to the authority of the state disintegrated (McClintock, 1998).   
 
Nepal 
 Nepal’s intelligence capabilities were nowhere near that of Peru’s and their strategy 
suffered greatly as a result. The agencies responsible for intelligence gathering (the police, the 
National Investigation Department, the Royal Nepal Army) ―were quite unprepared for the 
demands of the internal war and generally deficient in both information gathering and 
intelligence production/dissemination‖ (Marks, 2003). As a result, the government mostly turned 
to traditional interrogation using torture. The government arrested and tortured over 1000 people 
in 1999 alone and in fact, more people were killed by the state between 1998 and 1999 than were 
killed by the Maoists (Do & Iyer, 2007) (Stevenson, 2001). In fact, it is estimated that over the 
course of the conflict, more than 70% of Nepal’s prisoners reported being tortured for 
information and half reported giving out false confessions as a result of that torture (Stevenson, 
2001). Thus, the information the government was receiving was not reliable and agencies did not 
coordinate with each other which made the limited intelligence they were acquiring useless. This 
ultimately hampered the government’s ability to coordinate the armed forces in the field. There 
was no cohesion in the government’s strategy at any point in the war.  
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Cambodia 
 It is no exaggeration to say that the Khmer Rouge had a distinct intelligence advantage at 
almost every single stage of the conflict, in part, because of their own cohesion and the complete 
breakdown of communication within the Cambodian government. From the start, the Khmer 
Rouge was better organized and was able to translate its gains from intelligence into strategic 
victories against the forces of the Khmer Republic. On the night of January 21, 1971, 100 
Communist commandos infiltrated and attacked the air force base at the Pochentong airfield, 
west of the capital Phnom Penh (Sutsakhan, 1980). Nearly every single aircraft at the base was 
destroyed and the Khmer Rouge used the chaos to attack several other villages around 
Pochentong, which forced the government to withdraw from its main offensive, Operation 
CHENLA. It was a brilliant tactical maneuver that caught the government completely off-guard, 
distracted it from its main strategic objectives, and inflicted an enormous cost on the 
government’s capability by eliminating its air advantage. Had the government a better 
intelligence capacity, it likely would have anticipated that an attack of that magnitude would take 
place and it could have prepared. This is an unfortunate theme that would be repeated throughout 
the course of the war. The government could not get its act together to coordinate strategy and 
because it did not, time and time again it would be caught off-guard by Communist counter-
attacks. 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Hypothesis 2 
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DV: Success 
Peru Yes No Yes Yes Victory 
Nepal No Yes No No Failure*  
Cambodia No Yes No No Defeat 
*In the case of Cambodia, defeat is meant to connote that their intelligence failures lead to the 
circumstance that the created the government’s overthrow. For Nepal, failure connotes the 
inability to successfully use intelligence to create favorable strategic outcomes leading to 
stalemate. These failures did not lead to their defeat as they did in the Cambodian case. 
 
Alternate Hypotheses 
 The alternate hypothesis for Hypotheses 2 would predict that traditional torture and 
interrogation will extract from prisoners the crucial information needed to anticipate rebel 
activities as well as take down the insurgent leadership. In the case of Hypothesis 2, the results 
here seem unequivocal rejecting that alternate hypothesis. Intelligence is critical to a successful 
war effort, but traditional torture and interrogation are not effective means of acquiring the 
information necessary to take down rebel organizations. For ten years, Peru found that to be the 
case and it was only when they changed their tactics to tracking and surveillance that they finally 
found success. As a result of their efforts, they were able to take out Guzman and decimate the 
capability of the Shining Path. In contrast, Cambodia had almost no intelligence capability and 
this simply decimated them throughout the war. They were constantly outwitted by the Khmer 
Rouge and as a result, they were completely outgunned. Nepal’s effort was similarly ineffective 
as torture released very little helpful information and the information they did get was made 
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useless by breakdowns in communication and coordination. As a result, the government was 
never close to taking out the Maoists’ charismatic leader Prachanda, a failure that may have cost 
them victory. It seems clear then that under close analysis of the three cases, the alternate 
hypotheses do not hold up. 
 
Conclusions 
 On almost every measure of the two hypotheses, Peru came out better than both Nepal 
and Cambodia, seemingly reinforcing their conclusions. Though Peru’s strategy was certainly 
not flawless, they fulfilled all of the critical success factors necessary to pull out a victory. They 
successfully supported the creation of civilian defense patrols by arming them and providing 
them with crucial guidance and oversight. Government arms that were provided to the civilian 
populace generally did not find themselves in the hands of the Shining Path. Communication 
between both the rondas and the military and the government and the military was strong. They 
each knew what the other was doing which helped make Peruvian strategy more coherent and 
effective. This was reinforced by their potent intelligence capabilities discussed in Hypothesis 2. 
Peru’s intelligence capabilities reached a turning point in 1990 with the formation of the Special 
Intelligence Group. By adapting their intelligence strategy and transitioning it to one based on 
careful tracking and surveillance, Peru was successfully able to track Shining Path leader 
Guzman on September 12, 1992 in an apartment in Lima. After this point, the Shining Path was 
never the same and the war effectively reached its close. Peru conclusively supports the 
strategies laid out by Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 Nepal and Cambodia failed on nearly every front. The only substantive way they differed 
was on the arms distribution measure. In attempting to facilitate the civilian defense patrols, 
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Nepal distributed arms without much oversight which provided the Maoists with easy firepower, 
though it did help support civilian defense to a small degree. Cambodia’s strategy on the other 
hand, was completely flawed. It tried to incorporate the civilian population into the army, but 
only gave them extremely outdated weapons with very little training, making the whole program 
essentially useless as they were easily routed by the communists. Both cases were characterized 
by a complete breakdown of coordination between those responsible for creating strategy and 
those responsible for implementing it.  
 Counterinsurgency is incredibly complex. Each civil conflict is unique as are the 
immense challenges they present. While there are no easy solutions, there are general indicators 
that mark a successful strategy for the governments tasked with implementing them. It is a 
strategy that relies on the smart prosecution of a war effort that wisely engages the entire 
population to rise in defense of the country and uses intelligence to support military capability. 
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